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Christopher A. Hart
Chairman, NTSB
Pilot Training Issues Identified
in Accident Investigations
Outline
– NTSB Basics
– Some Pilot Training Issues
• Part 121
• General Aviation
NTSB 101
– Independent federal agency, investigate 
transportation mishaps, all modes 
– Determine probable cause(s) and make 
recommendations to prevent recurrences
– Primary product: Safety recommendations
• Favorable response > 80%
– SINGLE FOCUS IS SAFETY
– Independence
• Political: Findings and recommendations based upon
evidence rather than politics
• Functional: No “dog in the fight”
Part 121 Pilot Training Issues
‒ What to add, what to drop, in the limited 
training agenda
‒ Automation
‒ CRM
‒ Training for rare events
‒ How many failures is too many?
Pilot Training Curriculum
– Training time is limited
– Accidents and incidents often reveal need for 
additional types of training
– Recent examples (from Air France 447) include
• Response to loss of airspeed information in cruise
• Manual flight at cruise altitude
• Recognition of, avoidance of, and recovery from 
aerodynamic stall at cruise altitude
– What to drop when new types of training are 
added?
Automation Training Issues
– Objectives:
• Optimize the effectiveness of the automation
• Maximize likelihood of successful outcome if 
something goes wrong
– Most effective way to train:
• By rote, e.g., you do “x,” and the system will do “y”?
• To understand system architecture and concept?
– How to optimize use of automation without 
causing a loss of basic piloting skills?
– How to ensure that increasing automation will 
not undermine professionalism?
Air France 447, Rio to Paris, 2009
– The Conditions
• Cruise, autopilot engaged
• Night, in clouds, turbulence, near
thunderstorms, coffin corner
• Ice blocked pitot tubes, thus no
airspeed information
• Autopilot and autothrottle became inoperative upon losing 
airspeed information
• Protections against aerodynamic stall disabled without airspeed 
information
• Pilots responded inappropriately, caused aerodynamic stall
• Crashed into the ocean, fatal to all 228 on board
– Queries:
• Pilot training re loss of airspeed information in cruise?
• Importance of CRM – pilot knowing other pilot’s actions?
• Pilot training re manual flight at cruise altitude?
Asiana 214 Landing at SFO, 2013
– The Conditions
• Landing SFO Rwy 28L,  >11,000 feet
• VFR, negligible wind, 1128 PDT
• ILS glide slope transmitter inoperative
• Attempted manual landing
• Unaware that autothrottle was not maintaining speed
• Became low and slow, go-around attempted too late, struck 
seawall
• 3 fatalities
– Queries:
• Pilots adequately trained about system?
• Inadequate warning re loss of automatic speed control?
• Inadequate CRM?
• Inadequate maintenance of manual skills?
CRM Training
– Significant progress since implementation
– “Soft” skill
• More difficult to convince pilots that it’s important
• More difficult to measure progress
– Frequent problem in accidents:  Failure by 
pilots to communicate with each other
– Recent examples
• UPS 1354, approach to Birmingham, 2013
• Air France 447, Rio de Janeiro to Paris, 2009
• Colgan 3407, approach to Buffalo, 2009
Training for Rare Events
‒ Training time limited, generally less training for 
less frequent events 
‒ In deciding appropriate level of training for rare 
events, important to consider potential severity
– Examples
• V1 engine cuts:  Many pilots never have an engine failure 
on takeoff in their entire career, but likelihood that actual 
failure could be catastrophic is high
• Loss of airspeed information in cruise
• Loss of autopilot, necessitating manual flight, in cruise
• Aerodynamic stall, near ground or in cruise
Training Failures
‒ How many failures are allowed?
‒ Example:  Colgan crash at Buffalo
• Captain failed first attempt at
FAA Commercial check ride
FAA Instrument check ride
FAA Multi-engine check ride
• Also failed two airline currency rides
• Pilot’s response to stick shaker/pusher in 
accident flight was to pull (with 95 lbs of force)
General Aviation Training Challenges
‒ Basic “required” cycle is only every two 
years
‒ Tremendous variability in
• Student situations
• Student abilities
• Missions to be trained for
• Training curricula
• Instructor capabilities
Tall Pole in the GA Tent
‒ Loss of control in flight (fixed-wing)
‒ Typically involves aerodynamic stall
• Straight stall
• Accelerated (more than 1 g) stall
• Takeoff/climb stall (back side of the power curve)
• Yaw stall (spin)
• Skidded turn/cross-controlled stall
‒ Multi-engine aircraft
• All of the above plus Vmc roll
– Solution:  Better training, aided by AOA indicator?
• Improve instructor understanding of stall aerodynamics
• Training re AOA indicator
Other Than Stick and Rudder Skills
‒ Judgment:  Go, no-go decision, “get-home-itis”
• Must consider pilot, airplane, and environment
– Single-pilot “CRM”:  Best use of available resources
‒ Impairment
• Increasing presence of impairing drugs (OTC, prescription, and 
illegal) in GA fatal crashes
• How to find out which drugs may cause impairment?
• How to find out how soon to fly after taking those drugs?
‒ Fatigue
• No requirements
• Self-diagnosis is unreliable
• Impairs both decision making and execution
‒ Personal electronic devices
‒ Fatal accidents in every mode due to inappropriate use
Generic Training Issue:  
Complacency
‒ Complacency:  “A feeling of being satisfied with how things 
are and not wanting to try to make them better”
‒ However, safety is a never-ending journey that requires 
continuous improvement
‒ Common manifestation of complacency is lack of procedural 
compliance, e.g., failure to use checklist; hence, NTSB 
produced a safety video on procedural compliance
‒ Training challenge:  How to train against human nature, to 
continue focusing on safety as adverse events become more 
rare???
‒ Recent example:  Bedford, MA, 2014
G-IV Takeoff From Bedford, 2014
– Pilots almost always flew together
in the same airplane
– Combined total time almost 30,000 hours,
excellent training, unblemished records
– Before Starting Engines checklist:  Disengage gust lock – not done
– After Starting Engines checklist:  Controls free and correct – not 
done
– Pilots did not do “Controls free and correct” in 173 of previous 175 
takeoffs
– Not deterred by yaw damper limiting light, inability to move throttles 
to target take-off EPR, inability to rotate
– Waited too long to abort, overrun fatal to all 7 on board
Conclusions
– Most aircraft will have human pilots for the 
foreseeable future 
– Aviation safety will always ultimately depend 
upon adequate initial and recurrent training of 
those pilots
– Training challenges are evolving as systems 
become more complicated and automated
– Training challenges are increasing as 
operations become safer
Thank You
Questions?
